DARKNESS LOOMS Fixation on Climate Change, Europe is overlooking more Urgent Threats to its Energy Security It is a little over half a century since I, Ni gel Lawson, joined the Financial Times as a feature writer and found myself writing about the threat to Europe’s oil supplies from Colonel Nasser’s closure of the Suez Canal. It is a little over a quarter of a century since Margaret Thatcher appointed me U.K. Energy Secretar y. So one way and another, I have been a close observer of the energy scene for quite a long time now. But I cannot recall a time when it was arguably more dangerous, or certainly more bizarre. Discussion of energy in Europe t oday tends to be dominated by what are d escribed as environmental’ issues, chiefly the question of carbon emissions and global warming. So much so, in fact, that the rat her more urgent matter of securi ty of supply is all too often overlooked. But it is now becoming acute. It has two dimensions. The fi rst relates to the potential unreliability of our sources of primary energy. We have long been used to the fact that our oil comes overwhelm ingly from th e endemically unstable Middle East — an instability that in the age of al-Qaeda has grown, just w hen the decline of North Sea oil is increas ing our dependence on it. But Europe is now, in addition, substantially and increasingly dependent on Russian gas to fuel it s power stations. As Javier Solana, the E.U.’s High Representative for Foreign and Secu rity Policy, delic ately put it earlier this month, “There is justified concern across Europe about Russia seeming more interested in investing in future leverage than in fu ture production.” Not that Europe is doing anything about it, by way of constructing adequate gas storage to meet any interruption of supply. But the greater threat to Europe’s energy supply lies at home, in the looming prospect of a growing gap between dem and for electricity and t he capac ity of power stations to supply it. The problem is probably most ac ute in Germany, which is committed — on politically compelling but rationally inexplicab le grounds — not only to building no mor e nuclear power stations, but to closing do wn those it already has. But environmental opposition to building conventio nal, fossil-fuel power statio ns, because of the carbon- dioxide emissions these cause, is also strong and growing str onger, supported by the environment wings of Europe’s governments. As a result , it has be en calculated that Ge rmany will lose some 25% of its electricity- generating capacity by 2030; and today, it is only barely sufficient for the country’s needs. Germany hopes to import the electricit y shortfall from France, which generate s roughly three-quarters of its elect ricity from nuclear power, and is happy to do so. But France will not gener ate enough to satisfy Eu rope’s growing shortfalls. For Germany is by no means alone. 1 The essence of the problem is the reduction of em issions to which Eur ope has committed itself, coupled wit h largely environmental planning delays. A top executiv e at E.On, Germany’s largest energy group, recently pointed out that, while nuclear power stations take a long time to build, partly because of the very necessary safety standards that have to be met, in Europe it t akes even longer to get a planning application approved. But the position is little bette r with coal-fired power stat ions, which are more economic than nuclear rower and rely on an indigenous fuel supply which exists in abundanc e. The Britis h government is expected to appr ove, sub ject to it satisfying a host of conditions, the construction of th e first coal-fired power station to be built in the U.K. for decades— as it happens, by E.On—at Kingsnorth in England. One of those conditions, which the government proudly trumpeted, was that it should be fitted wit h carbon- capture and storage technology (CCS). This is a wonderful solution to the emissi ons and energy-security problem, since the carbon dioxide produced by burning the coal is captured and buried deep underground, rather than being let loose in the atmospher e. There is only one snag: the technology does not exist. It may, in 10, 20 or 30 years’ ti me: there is growing R&D ac tivity in this sphere. Or it may not: as the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, Alistair Darling, told the House of Commons early la st year, when he was the mini ster responsible for U.K. energy policy, the technologies required for commercial CCS “might nev er become available.” Not surprisingly, Whitehall has now discreetly dropped the CCS c ondition for Kingsnorth. All in all, the likelihood of the lights going out in Europe at some point over the next 20 years has never been greater. But the chanc es are that, although there may be occasional blackouts, the gap between s upply and demand will be met partly by a substantial rise in the price of electric ity and partly by reducing demand as Europe gradually becomes a manufacturing- free zone, as its industries migrate to China, India, Turkey, Morocco, or anywhere where planning delays are negligible and electricity is cheaper. This is not, of course, going to reduc e global emissions at all; but we can perhaps console ourselves that it is a more useful form of overseas aid than most. But it is, as I said, bizarre. COURTESY – TIME 2

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