51 Paper No. 272 FLOOD 2010: THE EVENT, ISSUES AND WAY FORWARD Engr. Asrar-ul-Haq, Engr. S. Mansoob Ali Zaidi 52 Engr. Asrar-ul-Haq, Engr. S. Mansoob Ali Zaidi International Workshop on Floods in Pakistan-2010 53 FLOOD 2010: THE EVENT, ISSUES AND WAY FORWARD Engr. Asrar-ul-Haq1 and Engr. S. Mansoob Ali Zaidi2 ABSTRACT Torrential rains in the catchment areas of Swat, Kabul and Indus Rivers during the last week of July and first fortnight of August generated unprecedented floods in the River Indus. The floods during July-August 2010 caused large scale damages to the Irrigation, flood protection and drainage Infrastructure in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtun Khwa, Punjab and Sindh and a part of Balochistan. The flood damages in Punjab occurred mainly in the Districts of Mianwali, Bhakkar, Layyah, Muzaffargarh, D.G. Khan, Rajanpur and Rahim Yar Khan. The flood 2010 was unprecedented and extraordinary in the known history of the Indus river system and the flood peaks were far in excess of the recorded historical floods. Further, the duration of flood peaks is generally short, ranging from 12 to 24 hours. In case of super flood 2010, however, the duration of peaks was extraordinarily long, as the Exceptionally High and Very High flood persisted for 115 hours at Jinnah Barrage and for 124 hours at Taunsa Barrage. Damages at Jinnah barrage were averted by operating the breaching section. The barrage was vulnerable and earmarked for rehabilitation during 2010 through World Bank assistance. Flood peak reached Taunsa barrage on 2 nd August 2010. The barrage complex worked perfectly well but the Left Marginal Bund (LMB) could not sustain the pressure of flood waters and breached at RD 32-33 and became the main cause of damages. The main issues confronted during the course of Flood 2010 were that infrequent floods caused extreme drying of embankments, cracking and rodent holes weakening the structures. In addition, this also induced lowering of guard to the level of complacency in terms of institutional preparedness. During this large scale emergency, lack of leadership and coordination was observed due to dysfunctional District and Tehsil Administration system. Emergent repair works have been almost completed. All canals were made operational by September 15, 2010. Medium Term works including Damages to the distribution system would be repaired by end March 2011. However non perennial channels would be opened during Kharif 2011 i.e. in April. Longer term works related to protection and drainage works will be taken up after establishment of new bench marks and comprehensive evaluation. Drawing upon the lessons of Flood 2010, the strategies for improving flood management include; establishment of new benchmarks including highest flood levels, Freeboard, etc design of embankments is to be made and the standard operating procedures have to be revised to ensure their utility/adequacy under the present conditions. SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) for flood management have to be prepared for individual structures keeping in view the identified weak areas / hotspots. Contingency plan is to be prepared which shall indicate the infrastructures located in the flood route with special focus to low lying areas and villages / towns to be affected. Flood protection works should be given due importance/preference/priority in resource allocation irrespective of the low frequency of floods. 1 Chief, Strategic Planning / Reform Uni t, Irrigation & Power Department, Government of the Punjab, Old Anarkali, Lahore-54000, Pakistan 2 Associate National Development Consultants Pvt Lt d. and Vice President, Pakistan Engineering Congress 54 Engr. Asrar-ul-Haq, Engr. S. Mansoob Ali Zaidi 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 Meteorological Setting 2010 Meteorologists all over the world indicated that the meteorological setup in Pakistan during the period of July and August of 2010 was unique in terms of spatial coverage, duration and intensity comparing with the historical events. Atmospheric regimes stretching from Western Europe to South-east Asia caused unusual weather throughout the region – including the extreme heat and wildfires in Russia, the on-going catastrophic flooding and landslides in China and severe weather and flood events in central and northern Europe. (Pakmet, 2010) Meteorologists also noticed that in early July 2010, a strong ridge of high pressure began to develop near the Ural Mountains in Russia. This ridge became stationary and established a blocking pattern, named as an “Omega Block by the meteorologists of the world due to its shape across almost all of the western Russia. As the ridge remained stationary for nearly two consecutive months, persistent rains fell in most of the areas of Pakistan and in parts of Afghanistan and Indian held Jammu and Kashmir beginning at the end of July 2010. With an abnormally active jet stream running around the periphery of the Omega Block into western Pakistan, profuse amounts of hot and moist air produced what some of the meteorologists called a “Super-charged Monsoon”, as this unstable atmosphere led to a highly unusual pattern of long duration and high intensity rainfall. Meteorologists are of the opinion that the rapid development of a La Niña cycle in the Pacific Ocean, typically resulting in a heavier-than-normal monsoon season in South Asia, also played a role in helping create a rarely-seen atmospheric setup that led to disastrous floods in Pakistan. (PARC, 2010; Pakmet, 2010) Torrential rains in the catchment areas of Swat, Kabul and Indus River during the last week of July and fist fortnight of August generated unprecedented flood in the River Indus. The floods during July-August 2010 inflicted large scale damages to the Irrigation, flood protection and drainage Infrastructure in the provinces of Khyber Pakhtun Khwa, Punjab, Sindh and some parts of Balochistan. In Punjab, the worst hit areas were in the Districts Mianwali, Bhakkar, Layyah, Muzaffargarh, DG Khan, Rajanpur and Rahim Yar Khan. (NDMA, 2010) 1.2 Institutional Structure for Flood Management and Relief The agencies responsible for flood management and relief are the following: i) Flood Forecasting and Warning: National Flood Forecasting Bureau / Meteorological Department is responsible agency. ii) Flood Management / Fighting: Punjab Irrigation Department is the responsible agency. iii) Flood Relief: Relief Commissioner / Punjab Disaster Management Authority are the responsible agencies. 1.3 Flood Management by IPD Punjab Irrigation Department is responsible for the operation and maintenance of one of the largest Irrigation networks in the world. Irrigation & Power Department is responsible for rivers and riverain surveys, barrages construction work and all matters connected therewith, flood control and flood protection schemes. (IPD, 2010) The various functions performed by IPD for flood management are to: • Prepare and update Flood Fighting Plans • Carry out inspection of flood works and also joint inspections with concerned agencies International Workshop on Floods in Pakistan-2010 55 • Repair flood bunds and maintain and upkeep the related facilities • Maintain headworks reports and flood related data on the barrages • Replenish reserve stock of stone and procurement of flood fighting material • Obtain information for flood forecasting/warnings • Communicate timely flood forecast / warnings within the Department and to other related agencies • Arrange for flood watching and setting / shifting of camps for flood management • Closely monitor and regulate flood flows at barrages • Make special arrangements for safety of vulnerable points • Prepare for operation of breaching sections in case of emergency • Carry out flood management of hill torrents • Carry out upkeep and maintenance of flood related infrastructure • Rehabilitate and modernize the existing barrages and optimize options for safe passage of flood discharges 1.4 Flood Protection Infrastructure Flood protection infrastructure generally comprises river banks protections (direct and indirect protections), river containing structures (flood embankments, retired bunds, marginal bunds), river training structures (spurs or groynes, studs, guide banks, pitched islands, gabions retaining walls, submerged sills and diversion bunds etc). River training works cover various types of structures constructed across or along a river to guide and confine the flow in the river channel and to control and regulate the river for effective and safe movement of floods and river sediment. It aims at controlling and stabilizing a river along a desired course with a suitable water way mainly for flood and bank protection, sediment control and land reclamation. Table 1: Saline Features of Flood Protection Infrastructure in Punjab River Length of Rivers (miles) Length of Bunds (miles) No. of Spurs / Studs Indus 342 507 131 Jhelum 227 97 43 Chenab 457 831 309 Ravi 434 394 127 Sutlej 322 254 30 Total: 1782 2,083 640 Source: IPD, 2011 56 Engr. Asrar-ul-Haq, Engr. S. Mansoob Ali Zaidi 2. FLOOD 2010 – FACTS AND EVENTS 2.1 Key Feature of Flood 2010 The following key features of the flood 2010 reflect that this flood was unprecedented and extraordinary in the known history of the Indus river. 2.1.1 Very Long Dry Spell The exceptionally high floods in Indus river were experienced after a very prolonged low discharge spell with the result that the embankments and the flood infrastructure had not been tested and the overall state of readiness had declined. Due to this long low discharge spell, the settlements within the river Khadir had also increased and the river channels started experiencing a siltation trend. As a consequence, very high flood levels were recorded along the embankments, which were beyond their design parameters and endangered the safety of the embankments and also caused breaches. 2.1.2 Quantity and Return Period The super flood 2010 was unprecedented in the context that the flood peaks were far in excess of the recorded historical floods. This is indicated from the figures given below. It has been estimated that the flood 2010 was a 600 years extraordinary event. (IPD, 2011) Figure 1: Historic and Current Flood Peaks on River Indus International Workshop on Floods in Pakistan-2010 57 Figure 2: Peak Discharges at Jinnah Barrage 1947-2010 Figure 3: Peak Discharges at Taunsa Barrage 1958-2010 2.1.3 Duration Normally the duration of flood peaks is short, ranging from 12 to 24 hours. But in case of super flood 2010, the duration of peaks was extraor dinarily long, as the Exceptionally High and Very High flood persisted for 115 hours at Jinnah Barrage and for 124 hours at Taunsa Barrage. The long duration of flood 2010 is presented in the Table below: 58 Engr. Asrar-ul-Haq, Engr. S. Mansoob Ali Zaidi Table 2: Duration of Flood Stage (Hours) Duration of Flood Stage (Hours) Barrage High Very High Exceptional High Kalabagh 131 85 30 Taunsa 116 97 27 2.1.4 Recurring Peaks Another important feature of the 2010 flood was that two peaks were received in river Indus over two weeks period, which exerted extr eme pressure on the infrastructure, supervisory staff and the watching establishment. 2.1.5 Continuous Rainfall and Hill Torrent Flooding The flood situation was further exacerbated due to continuous rainfall in the river flood plane, which hampered the flood fighting activities through slippery embankments crests. The repeated and extreme hill torrent flooding in Mianwali, DG Khan and Rajanpur districts added to the complexity of the situation. 2.2 Sequence of Events The sequence of main events of flood 2010 is presented in Box-1. (IPD, 2011) BOX-1: Sequence of Events 9 Torrential rains in the catchment areas of Swat, Kabul and Indus River during last week of July and First fortnight of August. 9 Exceptionally High Flood hit Kalabagh/Jinnah Barrage on 30-7-2010. LGB breached on 29-7-2010 and breaching section activated on 30-7-2010 to save the barrage. 9 With concerted efforts and intense flood fighting, major damages at Kalabagh/Jinnah barrage averted. 9 Flood Peak reached Taunsa barrage on 02-08-2010. The barrage was saved by hectic efforts spread over five continuous days. 9 LMB, however, could not sustain the pressure of flood waters and breached at RD 32-33 on 2-8-2010. 9 The breach in LMB was the main cause of the extensive damages and inundations in Muzaffargarh District via TP link / Muzaffargarh canal. 9 The super flood, after crossing Taunsa, attacked the protection bunds in DG Khan, Rajanpur and Rahimyar Khan Districts with a discharge of 1.20 Million cusecs. 9 The situation became more critical due to continuous heavy rainfall and high flows in hill torrents. 9 Strenuous efforts were made to save the bunds through day and night watching. 9 Jampur flood bund and Mithankot flood bund could not withstand the thrust of flood water and breached, inundating the towns. The protection bund at Mithan Kot was overtopped. 9 The left marginal bund of Guddu barrage, maintained by Sindh, also breached nea r Bhong town. This inundated vast areas and National highway connecting Punjab with Sindh. 9 A second wave of very high flood generated in river Indus in the second week o f August 2010 also aggravated the flood situation. International Workshop on Floods in Pakistan-2010 59 2.3 Breaches / Cuts in the Irrigation and Flood Infrastructure 2.3.1 Overall Status The summary of various types of Breaches / Cuts in Punjab during the flood 2010 is depicted below: Table 3: Flood 2010 – Summary of Breaches / Cuts Sr. No. Name of Zone Breaching Section Breaches Cuts made by Department Cuts made by Public 1 Sargodha 1 1 – – 2 DG Khan 1 45 12 20 3 PMO Barrages (Taunsa Barrage) – 10 – 1 4 Bahawalpur – 11 – – Grand Total: 2 67 12 21 2.3.2 Jinnah Barrage The upstream Left Guide Bund of Jinnah Barrage breached at RD 3000 on 29.7.2010. The breach developed rapidly to 900 ft. It was apprehended that in case the LGB collapsed, left flank, head regulator of Thal Canal and Jinnah Barrage may be severely damage in addition to colossal damage to the Irrigation network and other public and private infrastructure. Management of the Maple Leaf cement factory was approached and requested to provide necessary assistance. The management of the factory rendered tremendous help and stopped further erosion by dumping big sized boulder stones with help of their machinery. Further erosion was checked and system was saved from devastation. In addition the breaching section situated at RD 6700 – 8700 was operated with the help of Army Authorities which reduced pressure on the LGB. Both these breaches did not result in any damage to protected property or loss of life. 2.3.3 Taunsa Barrage The Left Marginal Bund of Taunsa Barrage breached in RD 32-33 on 02-08-10, when the discharge in the River Indus was approaching 1.1 million cusecs i.e. at the breach point which is a 1 in 600 years flood by some estimates. Despite intense watching of the bund along with staff and earth moving machinery, the breach speedily developed to 1000 ft and 125,000 cusecs discharge was diverted, which after breaching banks of Taunsa Panjnad Link Canal and Muzaffargarh Canal, flooded a vast area in District Muzaffargarh. 60 Engr. Asrar-ul-Haq, Engr. S. Mansoob Ali Zaidi Figure 4: Taunsa Barrage – Flood Protection Infrastructure Source: PDMA, 2010 Figure 5: Breaches on Left Side of Taunsa Barrage Source: PDMA, 2010 2.3.4 Canal Infrastructure Extensive damages occurred to irrigation canal infrastructure including branches, distributaries and minors. TP Link suffered breaches at 4 different locations. Muzaffargarh Canal breached at 6 locations and 4 breaches occurred to Rangpur Canal. Due to some uncontrolled International Workshop on Floods in Pakistan-2010 61 and controlled breaches (for effective drainage of flood water), a large scale area was inundated in Rajanpur and Muzaffargarh Districts. Figure 6: Breaches in Muzaffargarh Canal Figure 7: Inundation of Muzaffargarh Canal Command Area Source: PDMA 62 Engr. Asrar-ul-Haq, Engr. S. Mansoob Ali Zaidi 2.4 Flood Damages The damage need assessment for the flood 2010 was made by World Bank and Asian Development Bank. The overall assessment was to the tune of US$ 10.0 billion, and sectoral damage assessment for irrigation was US$ 278 million. The purpose of this exercise was to assess the extent of damages and losses caused. The damage assessment was conducted through data verifications while needs assessment was based on analysis and policy decisions. Sector-wise summary of damages prepared in the Pakistan Development Forum by Asian Development Bank and World Bank is depicted in the following table: (ADB _ World Bank, 2010) Table 4: Sector-wise Damage Need Assessment Sr. No. Sector US$ Million 1 Irrigation 278 2 Housing 1,588 3 Agriculture 5,045 4 Transport and Communication 1,328 5 Energy 309 6 Private Sector 282 7 Education 311 8 Health 50 9 Water and Sanitation 109 10 Governance 70 11 Financial 674 12 Environment 12 Total: 10,056 International Workshop on Floods in Pakistan-2010 63 Figure 8: Flood 2010 – Inundations along River Indus The flood damage assessment for irrigation and flood was carried out by World Bank and Asian Development Bank in order to determine the extent of reconstruction and remodeling of damaged infrastructure. Based on the damage need assessment, the following two options shown in Table 5 were presented: Table 5: Irrigation and Flood Sector Damage and Reconstruction Costs Province/ Region/ Agency Damage US$ millions Needs: Option 1* US$ millions Needs: Option 2** US$ millions AJK 0.2 0.2 11.4 Baluchistan 29.6 45.6 45.6 FATA 3.0 4.6 17.6 Gilgit Baltistan 1.6 2.5 27.2 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 68.4 105.0 600.3 Punjab 33.1 50.9 50.9 Sindh 136.9 210.6 210.6 WAPDA 4.9 7.5 7.5 Pakistan Met. Department 9.2 Federal Flood Commission 2.0 Sector Total 277.6 427 982.3 64 Engr. Asrar-ul-Haq, Engr. S. Mansoob Ali Zaidi * Option-1: Reconstruction with remode ling of selected damaged infrastructure ** Option 2: Preferred Compensation Sc enario – Reconstruction as for Option 1 PLUS measures for improved flood protection & management: • “building-back-safer” for critical settlements and urban areas prone to flash floods and river bank erosion in AJK, GB and KP, • Expansion of the Flood Early Warning Syst em to Swat, Peshawar and DG Khan areas • Revisit the country’s over all flood management strategy 3. FLOOD PLANNING AND MANAGEM ENT – A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 3.1 Flood Preparedness As a pre requisite of flood planning, various flood preparedness activities are carried out every year by the respective field offices in irrigation zones and by the Drainage & Flood Zone before start of flood season. The activities of flood preparedness includes preparation of flood fighting plans, maintenance and restoration of flood infrastructure, inspection of flood protection works, removal of encroachments from bunds and spurs, replenishment / procurement of reserve stocks of stone, other flood fighting materials and equipment. 3.1.1 Major Weaknesses in the Existing System The existing system for flood preparedness prescribes operating procedures (SOP) and departmental guidelines, which if observed in letter and spirit, could give a reasonable level of preparedness against impending flood eventualities. These procedures and guidelines were, however, not-fully followed due to lack of financing and urgency because of the long and sustained dry spells. As a result serious difficulties were encountered in the management of the super floods in the Indus River during August 2010. (IPD, 2011) The deficiencies observed with regard to flood preparedness during the flood season 2010 are described as under: • Weakened flood bunds due to infrequency of floods resulting in extreme damage caused due to drying of embankments, cracking and rodent holes. • This infrequency also induced lowering of guard in terms of institutional preparedness. • Outdated flood management plans and SOPs and lack of any ‘Plan B’ in the event of a breach. • A hyperactive and, often, erroneous electronic media, spreading rumours and undermining public’s trust in state machinery leading to active resistance everywhere to diversion of water to safer passage. • Timely relief cuts could have considerably reduced the damage but could not be made due to active resistance by locals. • Three departmental machines were burnt / damaged by mobs and staff was beaten / manhandled at number of places. Most flood management actions could be implemented only with assistance from Army. • Lack of leadership and coordination at District and Tehsil level. 3.1.2 Gap Analysis The following gaps / shortcomings have been indicated in management of floods: International Workshop on Floods in Pakistan-2010 65 • Flood Fighting Plans issued just in routine and not updated to incorporate changing field conditions. These also do not contain the contingency plans in case of breaches / other flood emergencies. • Flood works not maintained to design parameters. • The second defence lines not maintained properly, lack of financial resources and local discipline. • Wetting channels cover the embankments in limited reaches and are not being maintained properly / use for soaking and testing of embankments. • Aprons of spurs not constructed at lowest winter water levels remain prone to damages. • Unauthorized zamindara bunds and watercourses crossing exist on the embankments. • Priority for repair and restoration of flood infrastructure is accorded to spurs and most of the funds are allocated for restoration of aprons and pitching on spurs, while lesser importance is given to the restoration of earthen embankments. • Requisite corrective action not taken on the inspection reports/ recommendations of the inspection committees before the advents of the floods. • Bunds not inspected comprehensively by the concerned field formations before the flood season to locate rain cuts, gharas, runnels and porcupine holes etc. so as to take necessary corrective action. • Inadequate logistics and watching arrangements for the flood embankments at critical sites. • Inadequate flood fighting material and machinery arrangements at critical / vulnerable sites. • Growth of vegetation on embankments. • Updated river survey maps not available at the Barrages. • The weak spots of the embankments created by unauthorized ramps formed on the embankments due to trespassing generally not timely attended and repaired. • Encroachments along the embankments not checked and removed. • Lack of proper mobility along the bunds during rains. 3.1.3 Key Areas to be Addressed Standard operating procedures are required to be devised to address the gaps and deficiencies highlighted above so that a sound level of flood preparedness is achieved before the advent of floods. Most of the areas / omissions highlighted above can be tackled by preparing and implementing comprehensive flood fight ing plans and by strictly following other SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures). Monitoring and evaluation, which uptill now has almost been absent needs to be enforced forthwith. Monitoring is a continuous process whereas the evaluation of flood control structures must be done periodically at regular intervals at-least annually and more often if needed due to special circumstances. This can be done by the staff incharge or specially constituted evaluation teams. In addition, the interagency coordination among Pakistan Meteorological Department, Irrigation and Power Department, WAPDA, District 66 Engr. Asrar-ul-Haq, Engr. S. Mansoob Ali Zaidi Administration, Army, Police, Communication Media and Public Representatives needs to be improved. 3.2 Breaching Sections Locations and Efficacy The concept of breaching sections in flood bunds especially marginal bunds of barrages took shape after the floods of 1973. The idea was to save the barrages in case the flood discharge goes beyond the capacity of the barrage or the safety of Left Marginal Bund (LMB) is threatened. For this purpose a critical gauge was established in the LMB above which the bund was not considered to sustain. The breaching sections were established in Right Marginal Bunds (RMB) because on account of the general topography and land relief, any escapage through the LMB of barrages on any of the rivers in Pakistan does not return to the same river and flows on across the whole Doab destroying cr ops, dwellings, livestock, infrastructure and even human lives before it joins the next river. Thes e breaching sections served satisfactorily till recently but as the areas prone to be in-undated have undergone massive development and in addition to agriculture and habitation even industry has been established, thus making the operation of some of these breaching sections exceedingly difficult while others may follow suit. It is therefore expedient to revisit the provision and consider other options such as regular by- pass system for escaping surplus flood waters in the events of exceedance areas of the capacity of barrage or the LMB. The case of Taunsa Barrage requires particular attention, as it does not have an approved breach section and two canals exist on each side. Contingent plans therefore need to be developed in order to identify optimal arrangements for by-passing the discharges in case of super floods when the barrage capacity / safety is threatened. 3.3 Regulation of Khadir Area At many places in the river Khadir (active flood plain) tendency to take benefit of the dry periods through cropping and on some rivers even regular villages/towns has increased and become a reality. The classic example in this regard are the settlements in the bed of river Ravi around Lahore. During floods such encroachments in the active flood plain of the river become a sources of additional stress and need to be stopped. The following restrictions need to be imposed in letter and spirit. 3.4 Pond Area : Technical, Operational Implications Pond areas are the areas acquired for construction activities at the time of original construction of barrages and were retained to avoid objections from the relevant quarters against variation in pond levels required for feeding of canals and flood control and use as borrow areas. In some cases, the pond areas were leased out for agricultural purposes but with clear restrictions against heavy plantation or construction of any infrastructure. Later these areas were also declared as Game Sanctuaries. The pond area has been transferred to wildlife department and in some cases the pond areas having been auctioned to private parties, as in case of Islam Headworks. These measures limit the flood management and regulation operations at barrages and could only impose threat by the barrage safety. To put an end to all this, the following steps need to be taken: i) All pond areas should remain with the barrage divisions. ii) Agricultural use should be allowed only in accordance with established rules and restrictions. iii) No infrastructures be allowed to be raised in the pond areas. iv) Heavy plantation may not be allowed in pond area because it restricts the movement of river channel which is most of the time required for the effective operation of the barrage. International Workshop on Floods in Pakistan-2010 67 v) RAMSAR sites can be retained but with provisions that the barrage requirements are not compromised. 3.5 Role of FFC Federal Flood Commission (FFC) was established in January 1977 for integrated flood management on country wide basis. Functions of FFC are: i) Preparation of National Flood Protection Plan. ii) Approval of flood control schemes prepared by provincial Governments and concerned federal agencies. iii) Review of flood damages to public sector infrastructure and plans for restoration and reconstruction works. iv) Measures for improvement in flood forecasting and warning system. v) Standardization of design and specification for flood protection works. vi) Evaluation and monitoring relating to progress of implementation of the National Flood Protection Plan (NFPP). vii) Preparation of a research programme for flood control and protection. viii) Recommendation regarding principles of Regulation of reservoirs for flood control. The Commission is headed by a Chairman, who is also the Chief Engineering Advisor to the Federal Government. Members are, Chief (Water) P&D Division, Joint Secretary (Roads), Member Water (WAPDA), Director General PMD, Member Civil Engineering (Pakistan Railways) and four provincial Irrigation Secretaries. FATA, AJK, Northern Area and NOMA are co-opted members. Federal Flood Commission at present is providing a coordination role between the federal and provincial governments regarding funds allocation standardization of flood protection works parameters. It needs to play a more pragmatic role regarding forecasting of floods and flood management. Towards this end, it needs to conduct studies for scenario analysis for evolving holistic and more effective flood management at the national level. This has become urgent in view of the breaches on river Indus which impacted Sindh / Baluchistan provinces. New benchmarks and criteria for design and construction of flood infrastructure alongwith overall long-term plans for improving flood protection also needs to be evolved keeping in view the experience of flood 2010. (WAPDA, 2010) 3.6 Identification of Weak Areas / Hot spots Identification of weak area / hot spots can be made through Manual Inspections – This methods required extensive vigil and inspection of the embankment body foot by foot and is a time consuming effort. The detailed survey may be carried out well before commencement of flood season along all flood bunds, spurs & river training works and weak area may be identified. Efforts may be made to strengthen the weak area to avoid the mishap. The weak area may be ascertained on the following grounds: • Health of infrastructure • Structural sustainability of the flood bund/ river training work. • Hydraulic gradient line may not be exposed in any case. • Flow behavior of river and distance of main course / creek of river. 68 Engr. Asrar-ul-Haq, Engr. S. Mansoob Ali Zaidi • Villages, towns and big cities which may be affected due to any mishap. The inspections can be facilitated through the use of modern equipment like Ground Penetrating Radar (GPR) which is a simple trolley mounted equipment and uses electro- magnetic waves to determine cavities, hollows, runnels and even buried pipes etc. It is easy to use and is provided with necessary computer and software for interpretations of observations. This equipment provides a lot of promise for ensuring safety of existing embankments. Its use however has cost implications and requires trained operators and data interpreters. 3.7 Revised SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) The SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) require to be revised to ensure their utility/adequacy under the present conditions. SOPs to combat the flood may be prepared for individual structure / embankment keeping in view the weak area / hot spots identified earlier. Contingency plan may be prepared which should indicate the infrastructures coming in flood route with special focus to low lying area and villages / towns to be affected. 3.8 O&M Requirements The O&M yardstick need to be revised and updated to ensure proper maintenance of the flood infrastructure. Exclusive provisions need to be made for restoration of aprons of the spurs and to cover emergencies caused by river erosion. This is considered essential because substantial budget is spent for addressing emergencies and much less amount is available for normal maintenance of embankments. In addition, funds need to be earmarked for converting embankment tops into all weather roads. A review of the funding for the maintenance of embankments indicates that the budget allocations are short of the requirements with the result that the health of flood infrastructure has been impacted due to deferred maintenance. Year-wise demand and expenditure on flood infrastructure given below reflects this aspect: Table 6: Year-wise Expenditure on Flood Infrastructure (IPD, 2010) (Rs. in Million) Year Demand Allocated Expenditure 2004-05 272 199 197 2005-06 360 333 330 2006-07 473 423 418 2007-08 526 392 389 2008-09 527 456 455 2009-10 537 442 441 Substantial part of the maintenance budget is spent on spurs and on fighting emergencies during floods. This leaves much less budget for normal maintenance of embankments. The maintenance of embankments is further impacted due to long dry spells when the embankments develop cracks and rodent holes, etc. International Workshop on Floods in Pakistan-2010 69 4. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR RESTORATION OF FLOOD DAMAGES 2010 4.1 Description of Damages • Physical • Irrigation Network (Muzaffargarh, Rajanpur, DG Khan) including breaches in the main canals namely T.P Link Canal, Muzaffargarh Canal, D.G Khan Canal, Rangpur / Taliri Canal. • Breaches in the Left Guide Bank of Jinnah Barrage and breaches in the Left Marginal Bund of Taunsa Barrage • Flood Protection and drainage Structures (Bahawalpur (Guddu Barrage,), DG Khan (Jampur, Kot Mithan), Multan, Sargodha, Faisalabad and Lahore) • Financial Zone wise abstract of damages caused by flood 2010 is as under: Table 7: Zone-wise Abstract of Damages (Rs. in million) S. No Name of Irrigation Zone No. of works Type of work Estimated Cost 1 Sargodha 161 1269.190 2 D.G Khan 140 1100.000 3 PMO Barrages 20 637.000 4 Bahawalpur 29 176.240 5 Multan 11 12.353 6 Lahore 1 2.490 7 Faisalabad 3 2.172 G. Total: 365 Flood Protection Bunds and Irrigation Infrastructure 3199.445 Source: IPD, 2010 4.2 Flood Damages Restoration Strategy • Works divided in three categories: • Immediate – critical canal and embankment breaches, repair of which was necessary to contain inundation and restoration of canal supplies. • Medium term – strengthening of weak canal banks, repair of barrage support structures, buildings and repair of distributaries and minors network. • Long-term – strengthening and improvement of flood protection works on new bench marks 70 Engr. Asrar-ul-Haq, Engr. S. Mansoob Ali Zaidi Table 8: Estimated Cost of Works CATEGORY DESCRIPTION COST (RS. MIL.) Immediate Works Canal and embankment breaches 1,000 Medium Term Strengthening of weak canal banks, repair of barrage support structures and buildings 2,200 Long Term Strengthening and improvement of flood protection works on new bench marks. i) Strengthening and raising of existing bunds ii) Proving wetting channels along the bunds. iii) Provision of Second Defence Bunds. iv) Improving the drainage capacity to provide relief in case of breaches 7,000 4.3 Progress • LMB breach of Taunsa was closed on war footing basis on August 25, 2010 • Breaches of Muzaffargarh Canal, T.P Link Canal, D.G Khan Canal and Rangpur Canal were plugged and channels were made operational by September 15, 2010 • Work on damages to the distribution system is going on and would be repaired by end March 2011 and channels being non perennial in nature would be opened in April for Kharif 2011 • Repair works to the distributaries and minors being done through Departmental machinery while repair works to smaller minors and On Farm systems being done through farmer participation. • PC-Is for the longer term works on strengthening and up-gradation of embankments have been prepared and undergoing approval process at various fora. 4.4 Financing Arrangements i) Through Intra-sectoral ADP re appropriation (Rs.1440 million) ii) Through Inter-sectoral ADP re-appropriation (Rs.746milion) iii) Through intra adjustments in the O&M budget of I&P Department (Rs. 1002 million) 4.5 Implementation and oversight mechanism • Immediate works were carried out under emergency provisions • Wherever feasible, Departmental Machinery was used for breach closing • All emergency works were Supervised by Third Party Monitoring Consultants International Workshop on Floods in Pakistan-2010 71 5. RECOMMENDATIONS 5.1 Flood Planning and Management Flood fighting plans to be prepared and updated to incorporate changing techniques and field conditions. Flood works to be maintained to design parameters. The damaged aprons of spurs are to be repaired and maintained at lowest winter water level. Flood fighting materials to be arranged as per approved flood fighting plans and to be kept at pre-identified strategic site. Appropriate machinery for flood fighting is to be mobilized on barrages during flood seasons. Flood protection works should be given due importance in resource allocation irrespective of the infrequency of floods. There is a need for establishment of new bench-marks in terms of protection works heights and strengths and a fresh drainage plan for quick draining of flood waters from affected areas. The regulation at the Head works / Barrages needs to be done strictly according to the Regulation Rules. New river training works, whenever required, are to be planned by model studies. There is a need for identification and demarcation of river water route escaping from the breaching section and relief cuts. Efficient communication arrangements are to be made and effective coordination is required with the District Administration, Army and Police. Capacity building of the staff responsible for flood management on barrages needs to be enhanced by giving them appropriate training for flood fighting and management. Case study approach and special short training courses may be arranged for officers and officials of I&P Department on the subjects of flood preparedness / management, design, construction and maintenance of flood infrastructure and responding to flood emergencies. 5.1.1 Evaluating Health of Existing Flood Protection Infrastructure and Identifying Critical Needs for Rehabilitation / Improvements of Infrastructure The evaluation of health and safety of flood works at suitable and regular intervals bears paramount importance. The current situation is that the embankments remain dry for most of the time and may develop cracks, fissures and rodent holes, etc. These bunds therefore need effective surveillance through proper maintenance during dry period, and detailed in depth inspection and requisite repairs before the onset of the flood season. As already mentioned, the procedure currently in vogue leaves much to be desired, and the SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) needs to be updated and improved, back ed by effective and efficient monitoring systems. 5.1.2 Provision and / or Strengthening of Second Defence Line and Provision of Wetting Channels The planning of flood bund network and bund design need to be reviewed holistically and suitable plans and designs have to be prepared and implemented, as below: • All the flood bunds were to be redesign and improved accordingly. • The wetting channels may be provided along such embankments which are protecting big cities, major towns or major infrastructure / barrages. • The second defence embankments may be provided in the critical / important reaches or where the river main course is approaching to the 1 st defence embankments. • Where second defence embankments are already existing, then these embankment should be strengthened and properly maintained. 72 Engr. Asrar-ul-Haq, Engr. S. Mansoob Ali Zaidi 5.1.3 Adequate Funding for Maintenance of Flood Infrastructure Yardstick may be updated to cover the routine and emergency needs of flood embankments, spurs and river erosion. The funds may be provided as per Yardstick to each division well in time, but in case of emergency, special funds may be arranged for restoration without any cut in normal O&M funds. 5.2.1 Establishment of New Benchmark and Investments Resources and investments are to be identified not only to fulfill the current needs of the recent flood event but also to cater for the fu ture needs arising from future extreme events through establishment of new benchmarks regar ding HFL, freeboard, design of embankments, and safety measures for flood protection infrastructure. Regular updating of SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures), regular drills for disaster management, regular capacity building / training of managers for flood protection, barrage management and public handling during crisis is required. 5.2.2 Holistic Drainage Improvements Identification of flood release channels / escape channels may provide relief / reduction in flood peak discharge in the main rivers. There is a need to identify high and medium flood risk areas for permanent settlements and to devise appropriate solutions for speedy evacuation of flood waters through appropriately designed drainage infrastructure. An analysis needs to be made for Breaching options/relief cuts. The existing breaching arrangements need to be revisited and appropriate locations are to be fixed. Post breach options should also be analyzed for safe passage of spill water. Adequate drainage facilities may be provided on roads, highways and other related infrastructures. There is a need for upgrading to a higher level than usual the drainage facilities to provide protection to the cities and town and important installations such as power stations, oil refineries, industries etc. 5.2.3 Mitigation of Flood Peaks / Damages • Improving and extending the Flood Forecasti ng System to include the Upper Indus above Tarbela and Kabul river system above Nowshera. • Construction of on channel and off channel storages that would provide major reduction in flood peak discharges in the main rivers. • Flood Plain Mapping/Zoning along all the Indus river and its tributaries for identifying high and medium flood risk areas for permanent settlements. • Legislation for restricting the development of permanent settlements in river flood plain and in high flood risk areas. 5.2.4 Simulation and Scenario Analysis There is a need to build on the existing strength of Meteorological Department on weather and forecasting to provide more effective support to decision making in disaster risk management at the national, sectoral and local level. Flood forecasting and warning services needs to be fully integrated and enhanced institutional coordination and communication from central to local level is crucial for timely implementation of flood related activities and their field effectiveness. Critical observations infrastructure and its telecommunication facilities need to be reconstructed and calibrated. Forecasting models including software need to be updated and applied. To update the system following improvements are required to: • Operate the system for 2010 event in a manner to simulate the real time situation for different points in time in the Indus River System. International Workshop on Floods in Pakistan-2010 73 • Extend the model to include rainfall-runoff models of Kabul river of which Swat river is a tributary and Indus river upstream of Tarbela. • Review and revise the flood regulation guidelines for Tarbela reservoir with the objective of reducing flood peaks in the Indus river downstream. • Study the possible breach locations upstream of the structures. The path of flows through these breaches up to the point where it joins the river downstream should also be studied so that inundation patterns could be forecasted and the settlements in the flood passage may be restricted by law. 5.2.5 River Surveys / Model Studies River survey methodology needs to be improv ed by utilization of new technologies that have now become available for speedy and accura te surveys e.g. imageries, digitization, bathymetries and total stations. Model study for river training works be done from control point to control point and flood protection schemes should be planned in the light of recommendations of the model studies. 5.3.1 Improving Inter-Agency Coordination There is a need for a fresh look at the district and tehsil administration system to bring back the ability for effective leadership and coordination during emergencies. Efficient Communication links need to be established among Pakistan Meteorological Department, Irrigation and Power Department, WAPDA, District Administration, Army, Police, Press and Public Representatives. The widespread damages could have been contained in case there had been effective and improved coordination. At local level the District Coordination Officer should perform the main coordination role among various Departments including Irrigation, Agriculture, Police, District Administration, and others during the flood. 5.3.3 Role of D&F Zone Drainage and Flood Zone was established in 1974 and its role is to coordinate activities related to flood management and flood protection infrastructure with the field engineers and the Departments of Federal Flood Commission, Pak Meteorological Department, Pakistan Army and other related agencies. Monitoring and evaluation functions need to be entrusted to the D&F Zone for effective flood management. 5.3.5 Effective Security Arrangements Effective and efficient security arrangements should be ensured on all barrages with the help of district administration, police, Pakistan army and other related agencies. Effective security arrangements are also to be ensured by the law enforcing agencies not only for the safety of the public infrastructure but also for the personnel and Government officers working on barrages for flood fighting. Appropriate lighting arrangements should be made during the night time for effective surveillance on barrages. 5.5 Way Forward The following strategic interventions need to be planned and implemented for improving flood management and mitigating the impacts of flood disasters: • Build water storages to mitigate the impact of super floods • Build back better and safer structures keeping in view the new benchmarks • Invest in disaster preparedness and effective management of relief and early recovery when it happens 74 Engr. Asrar-ul-Haq, Engr. S. Mansoob Ali Zaidi • Better regulation of riverine / khadir areas and a proper regulatory and enforcement mechanism • Build positive synergies between an active media and positive spreading of message among masses during crisis • Flood protection works should be given due importance in resource allocation irrespective of the infrequency of floods • Regular updating of SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures), drills for disaster management, capacity building / training of managers for flood protection, barrage management and public handling during crisis • Promotion of spirit of Self Reliance in emergency relief and post disaster rehabilitation REFERENCES: 1. ADB and World Bank 2010. Pakistan Flood 2010: Damages and Needs Assessment. Pakistan Development Forum, Islamabad, 14-15 November, 2010. 2. IPD 2010 Past floods data, operational procedures. File records, Irrigation Department, Lahore. 3. IPD, 2011. Flood 2010: The events, issues and way forward. Flood Report 2010. Govt. of the Punjab, Irrigation & Power Department, March, 2011. 4. NDMA 2010. National Disaster Management Authority, Islamabad. Flood Damages Assessment report, 2010. 5. Pakmet 2010. Flood forecasting, Flood updates and rain fall data. Pakistan Metrological Department. http:www.Pakmet.com.pk 6. PARC 2010: Assessment of 2010 flood Impacts in Pakistan. Natural Resource Division, Pakistan Agricultural Research Council. Final Report, October 2010, Islamabad. 7. PDMA 2010. Flood 2010 Presentation. Punjab Disaster Management. 8. WAPDA 2010. Floods 2010: Management & damages. Hydrology and Water Management Organization, WAPDA November, 2010.

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